Australia will ban exports of alumina and aluminum ores, including bauxite, to Russia in a bid to limit the country’s ability to produce aluminum, Australia’s government said March 20. Russia relies on Australia for about 20% of its alumina, and the export ban will cut Russia’s ability to source a “critical input” into its “armaments industries,” Australia said. “The Government will work closely with exporters and peak bodies that will be affected by the ban to find new and expand existing markets,” Australia said.
When it runs out of its current equipment, the Russian military will face challenges sourcing critical technologies to upgrade and maintain its military goods, due to U.S. export controls (see 2202240069), the Atlantic Council said in a March 18 post on its website. But much of that could depend on how successfully the U.S. and its allies can enforce the restrictions, the Atlantic Council said, and whether Chinese companies comply with the restrictions or decide to supply chips to Russia and expose themselves to secondary sanctions or similar U.S. export controls (see 2203140009).
China is unlikely to violate U.S. sanctions against Russia because it fears the consequences of U.S. secondary sanctions too much, said Kevin Rudd, president of the Asia Society and former Australian prime minister. China also will likely avoid providing military support to Russia, Rudd said, which could invite similar U.S. sanctions that could hurt its major state-run and private technology companies.
Following the U.K.'s imposition of massive sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, the U.K.'s Export Control Joint Unit published a General License allowing the provision of technical assistance, financial services and funds, and brokering services for certain vessels. The ECJU authorized these activities where a restricted vessel is moving from a third country to Russia or the U.K., or to a third country from Russia or transiting Russian waters.
The U.K. amended the General License applying to transactions involving sanctioned Russian bank Sberbank. The license, "Correspondent Banking Relationships & Processing Sterling Payments," was altered to allow British credit or financial institutions to continue a banking relationship with Sberbank or a U.K. or non-U.K. credit or financial institution owned or controlled by Sberbank. The license expires March 31.
The EU last week issued a set of frequently asked questions to describe and clarify its new Russia export restrictions and sanctions. The 31-page document outlines items that are captured by the new restrictions, what exemptions are available, when the restrictions do and don’t apply, exporter compliance obligations and more.
The Russia and Belarus Financial Sanctions Act, clarifying that foreign subsidiaries of U.S. financial institutions must comply with American sanctions against Russia and Belarus, passed out of the House Financial Services Committee March 17 on a voice vote. The Nowhere to Hide Oligarchs' Assets Act, which gives the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network more access to records so that they can "detect Russian oligarchs who are participating in money laundering techniques to hide their money, avoid scrutiny, and evade our sanctions," passed out of the same committee on a 26-23 party-line vote.
The Commerce Department should tighten export restrictions on China’s top chipmaker to prevent it from importing sensitive semiconductor equipment and exploiting a U.S. export control loophole, Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., and Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Texas said. The lawmakers, who voiced similar concerns to Commerce last year (see 2103190005), said in a March 17 letter to Commerce that its export control licensing policies for Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation are “ineffective” and are denying less than 1% of export applications to sell technology to the company.
The U.K.'s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation amended 21 entries under its Russia sanctions regime, still subjecting them to an asset freeze. OFSI also corrected three entries under the sanctions list and removed duplications for two individuals from the consolidated list. The corrected entries are Mikhail Fridman, Alfa Bank board director; Petr Aven, Alfa Group supervisory board chair; and German Khan, DEA Deutsche Erdoesl AG supervisory board member. The duplicate listings were dropped for Yury Vorobyov, Federation Council of the Russia member; and Maya Bolotova.
The Congressional Research Service published a paper on the legal authority and organizational process behind the design and implementation of sanctions. The paper provides an overview of sanctions and export controls, and discusses the recent package targeting Russia and Belarus.