Although the Commerce and State departments have been able to conduct some export end-use checks during the COVID-19 pandemic, officials said both agencies continue to face challenges scheduling on-site inspections.
China objected to the U.S. decision to add 33 Chinese entities to its Unverified List, it said in a Feb. 7 news release. The Bureau of Industry and Security made the additions, which included universities and companies operating in China's technology and electronics sectors, due to its inability to verify the reliability of the entities through end-use checks (see 2202070012). According to an unofficial translation, China's Ministry of Commerce said that the U.S. should immediately correct its perceived wrongdoing and return to mutual beneficial cooperation. MofCom characterized this action, along with the U.S. past export control moves, as tools of "political suppression and economic bullying." A BIS spokesperson dubbed its end-use checks a "core principle" of the agency's export control system.
WuXi Biologics, one of China’s largest biotechnology companies, said it complies with all U.S. export control regulations despite the Commerce Department’s decision to add two of its subsidiaries to the Unverified List this week (see 2202070012). The company said it has been approved to import U.S. export-controlled “hardware controllers for bioreactors and certain hollow fiber filters” for 10 years. “We do not re-export or resell these items to any other entity,” WuXi said Feb. 8 in a statement.
The Bureau of Industry and Security added 33 Chinese entities to its Unverified List this week, including universities and companies operating in China's technology and electronics sectors. BIS hasn’t been able to verify the “legitimacy and reliability” of the entities through end-use checks, including their ability to responsibly receive controlled U.S. exports, the agency said in a notice. The UVL additions take effect Feb. 8
The Bureau of Industry and Security will add 33 Chinese entities to its Unverified List this week, including a range of companies operating in China's technology and electronics sectors, it said in a notice released Feb. 7. BIS said it hasn’t been able to verify the “legitimacy and reliability” of the entities through end-use checks, including their ability to responsibly receive controlled U.S. exports. All export license exceptions involving those parties will be suspended, and exporters must obtain a statement from any party listed on the UVL before proceeding with certain exports.
Two senators this week asked the Commerce Department to say whether it opposes stronger export controls against SMIC, China’s top chipmaker, as has been reported in the media, and to explain why.
The Bureau of Industry and Security issued a Feb. 3 final rule to reorganize, make corrections and clarify the scope of its foreign direct product rules. The changes, mentioned in the agency’s fall 2021 regulatory agenda (see 2112210044), help to clarify where and how the FDP rules apply and make some corrections to language in the Export Administration Regulations.
Lawmakers submitted a host of amendments to the House’s recently released China competition bill, including measures that would introduce new export controls and sanctions authorities and requirements. One submission, a 115-page amendment from Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Texas, would create more congressional oversight of the Commerce Department’s emerging and foundational technology control effort and calls for expanded export restrictions against Chinese military companies.
The Bureau of Industry and Security is hoping to expand the number of officers it sends overseas and increase collaboration with other investigative agencies, partly to help with a larger workload and a rise in new export control evasion trends. Agents said BIS has seen a steady increase in work since the enactment of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, which has been made more complex by the rise in cryptocurrency schemes, increasingly sophisticated uses of front companies and ransomware attacks.
Saber Fakih of the United Kingdom pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to illegally exporting and attempting to export an industrial microwave system (IMS) and counter-drone system to Iran, the Department of Justice said. Fakih also admitted conspiring with Bader Fakih of Canada; Altaf Faquih from the United Arab Emirates; and Alireza Taghavi of Iran. Fakih's actions violated the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulation, DOJ said Jan. 27.