The Bureau of Industry and Security completed an interagency review of a proposed rule that could place new export controls on certain “marine toxins.” The rule, sent for review March 21 (see 2203220005) and completed May 16, proposes changes to the Commerce Control List to reflect revisions recently made at the multilateral Australia Group.
The Bureau of Industry and Security recently sent a final rule for interagency review that would make corrections and clarifications to the agency’s Russia and Belarus export controls. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs received the rule May 13.
The Bureau of Industry and Security needs to “answer to Congress immediately” if U.S. software company Synopsys was able to illegally export semiconductor design software to blacklisted Chinese companies, Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Texas, said. McCaul -- referencing a report this week that said BIS is investigating Synopsys for potentially transferring technology to China’s HiSilicon and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (see 2204140057) -- said the agency needs to do a better job of preventing illegal exports on the front end.
The Commerce Department is investigating U.S. software company Synopsys for possibly violating U.S. export controls against China, Bloomberg reported April 13. Commerce is looking into whether Synopsys, the world’s leading supplier of semiconductor design software, worked with Chinese affiliates to provide chip designs and software to Huawei Technologies’ HiSilicon unit for manufacture at Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, the report said. Both companies are subject to Entity List licensing restrictions.
Although the Bureau of Industry and Security hasn’t yet announced any enforcement actions against lessors or financers of restricted Russian aircraft, those parties still face significant compliance risks, Katten said in an April 8 alert.
The Bureau of Industry and Security last week added Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland to the list of countries that have imposed similar export controls against Russia and are excluded from certain license requirements under two recently issued foreign direct product rules (see 2202240069). The additions take effect April 12. BIS previously added South Korea to the list (see 2203040075), which has more than 30 countries.
Australia will soon ban exports of luxury goods to Russia, following similar export restrictions by the U.S. and EU (see 2203110056 and 2203150027). The ban, which takes effect April 7, will apply to a range of goods, including wine, high-value cosmetics and parts for luxury vehicles, Australia's foreign affairs ministry said April 5. “The Australian government is deeply committed to imposing the highest costs on Russia for President [Vladimir] Putin’s illegal and unprovoked war,” the ministry said. Similar export restrictions imposed by Japan took effect April 5 (see 2203250030).
After the Bureau of Industry and Security added 120 entities to its Entity List last week for supporting the Russian and Belarusian militaries (see 2204010080), senior BIS official Thea Kendler said the U.S. won’t “hesitate” to impose more export restrictions.
The Bureau of Industry and Security sent a proposed rule for interagency review that could place new export controls on certain “marine toxins.” The rule, sent for review March 21, proposes changes to the Commerce Control List to reflect revisions recently made at the Australia Group, a multilateral export control group for chemical and biological weapons. If approved by the interagency, the proposed rule will request public comments on the control changes.
When it runs out of its current equipment, the Russian military will face challenges sourcing critical technologies to upgrade and maintain its military goods, due to U.S. export controls (see 2202240069), the Atlantic Council said in a March 18 post on its website. But much of that could depend on how successfully the U.S. and its allies can enforce the restrictions, the Atlantic Council said, and whether Chinese companies comply with the restrictions or decide to supply chips to Russia and expose themselves to secondary sanctions or similar U.S. export controls (see 2203140009).