US Warns of Rising Export Control Risks for Academia, Researchers

U.S. adversaries are “increasingly exploiting the open and collaborative environment of U.S. academic institutions for their own gain,” said James Cangialosi, acting director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, which published the guidance this week along with the FBI, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency and others. He said schools should follow the “mitigation strategies” in the guidance so they can “better protect their research, their institutions, as well as their staff and students.”

The guidance was issued one day after President Donald Trump told reporters that he planned to allow 600,000 Chinese students into the country, which would be more than double the number currently in the U.S. “We're going to get along with China,” he said.

Although the guidance stresses that the U.S. “values international collaboration as a cornerstone of academic excellence” because it “fosters innovation,” it also specifically warns about the risks posed to U.S. universities by researchers, students and others that hide their ties to the Chinese government.

“No nation has targeted Western research, science, and technology as aggressively as China,” it said. It called the Chinese government and intelligence services the “broadest, most active, and persistent espionage threat to the U.S.” and the “top threat to U.S. technology competitiveness,” specifically saying that China is looking to acquire advanced U.S. electronics, software, communications equipment, and “other materials to advance their economic and military objectives.” Beijing also is increasingly looking to recruit U.S. emerging technology experts, the guidance said, especially those working on AI, quantum, semiconductors, optics, hypersonics and energy systems.

The guidance warned researchers and other technology experts to be wary of foreign talent recruitment programs, which are organized by a foreign government or institution to recruit science and technology professionals or students in the U.S. Although working as part of one of those programs “is not illegal,” the guidance said it presents legal risks.

“Potential participants and their employers should be aware of legal issues that may arise as a result of participation, including violation of export-control laws, economic espionage, or violation of conflict-of-interest policies,” it said. “They frequently involve the unauthorized transfer of research materials, data, or other non-public information, and can lead to conflicting obligations between multiple employers or entities.”

It said talent plan participants have pleaded guilty to or been convicted of violating export controls laws and other crimes related to economic espionage and theft of trade secrets.

The guidance also warned about less formal foreign research collaborations, especially if they involve people from sanctioned or heavily restricted countries. It pointed to a case in 2023 in which a foreign national from a “U.S.-sanctioned country” emailed a U.S. academic and asked to collaborate on advanced missile technologies. The foreign person claimed to have expertise in an “unrelated field” while also claiming to have previously worked with other U.S. academics on hypersonic issues, the guidance said.

The U.S. said sharing information on that subject “would have provided hypersonic missile technology, considerably increasing military capabilities of the foreign national’s country.”

Researchers are also at risk of “talent poaching,” the U.S. agencies said, saying that “foreign threat actors” are “aggressively” recruiting American experts in AI, semiconductor, quantum, biotechnology, and other advanced technologies to help with their military programs. And those foreign actors sometimes hide that they’re connected to a foreign government, including China’s government.

The guidance said a South Korean consulting firm recently broadcast a talent search for U.S. semiconductor experts to work for “unspecified clients,” offering more than $300 per hour for their work. A “subsequent review revealed that the consulting firm was a front company for China’s People’s Liberation Army,” the guidance said.

People and institutions who help with the “unauthorized transfer or theft of sensitive research or information” to other countries -- “wittingly or unwittingly” -- may “face legal and financial consequences,” the agencies said. “This could include losing control over intellectual property, jeopardizing their professional credibility, and disqualifying them from future business or research opportunities, in addition to possible financial penalties and/or a jail sentence.”

It urged students and researchers to consider whether they’re working on technology that has military uses, whether the technology could “benefit a foreign state’s military,” or whether it’s “likely to be subject to U.S. export controls.” If it is, researchers should make sure they receive security training, follow their institution’s rules around “foreign collaborators”; identify any potential dual-use projects; take “extra steps” to protect U.S. government-funded research; “consult tech transfer offices on export regulations”; and more.

It also urged institutions to develop a “security strategy” to protect against those risks and secure research by using “templates and reviews for research agreements.” They should also “ensure compliance with export controls, disclosure requirements, and funding rules.”

The guidance also included several red flags that may indicate an attempt to steal research, such as:

• invitations to a foreign program offering “unusually lucrative incentives”
• unsolicited grants or gift funding from foreign institutions
• unsolicited offers of research positions or paid international conference engagements
• requests for research access or engagement through social media
• unauthorized requests to access sensitive or U.S. government-funded research
• sudden “unexplained affluence” of researchers, administrators, faculty, staff or students
• researchers that work odd hours or don’t disclose foreign travel.

The guidance also warned researchers to protect any sensitive information when traveling overseas, including by being “clear about the areas of research you should or should not talk about” and taking steps to “sanitize your laptop and mobile phone” before traveling to erase any sensitive information. Researchers should also reconsider even carrying an electronic device with sensitive research data on the hard drive.