Former Officials Warn UK Against Following US Trade Strategy Toward China

“I think national security policy on China has to be quite subtle,” Peter Ricketts, a former U.K. national security adviser, said during a hearing of Parliament’s Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. He said there “are areas of our relationship with China where they are pretty clearly adversaries,” and there are other areas where they are "dialogue partners.”

“I think our policy has got to be multifaceted to deal with the different aspects of China where we have different interests at stake,” Ricketts said. “And a good policy, well-coordinated across government, ought to be able to do that.”

Ricketts and others were testifying before the committee one day before the U.K. released its latest national security strategy, which emphasizes the importance of sanctions, export controls and other economic security tools to respond to adversaries. The strategy mentions the “geostrategic challenge posed by China” and calls on the U.K. to carry out “direct and high-level engagement and pragmatic cooperation” in certain areas while also countering certain threats posed by China, including espionage, cyberattacks and “the undermining of our economic security.”

Rachel Ellehuus, director general of the Royal United Services Institute think tank and the Pentagon’s former representative in Europe, said nearly “every country” is trying to figure out the best way to continue trading with China, including how to “almost create a sense of business as usual,” while also being “very wary in terms of some of the concerns around human rights” and Beijing’s support of Russia’s war against Ukraine. She said she believes the U.K. can “cooperate economically with China in a responsible way” while also trying to “ring fence the things that are really required to safeguard economic security.”

She specifically pointed to the fact that China makes much of the chips and raw materials that other countries need to produce important technologies, and the U.K., should be taking steps to diversify those imports away from China. Ellehuus also noted that the railway systems that make up the Deutsche Bahn, Germany’s national railway, “have quite a bit of Chinese content and ownership.”

But she also said the U.K. should differentiate the risks posed by China from the risks posed by Russia. Ricketts agreed, saying Russia is “more black and white,” and certain trade with China is good for the U.K.

“I don't want to make it sound like I'm not concerned about China, but the economic interests there are fairly mutual, and China doesn't really want to be seen as a partner that is not reliable in terms of provision of services and whatnot,” Ellehuus said. “I think I'm maybe a little bit less worried that we -- with a little bit of oversight and diligence about where the real vulnerabilities are -- that we could manage that.”

Asked by a committee member whether the U.K. should align its approach to China closer to that of the U.S., Ellehuus said: “I'll be a bit cheeky and say that I really am not sure exactly what the U.S. priorities are in the Indo-Pacific at the moment.” She said the Trump administration’s policy toward China has so far been marked by inconsistency.

“I think it would be very difficult for the U.K. to try to align with that,” Ellehuus said. “At once there are tariffs, but on the other hand, the United States seems happy to create numerous waivers and is continuing to do business with China.”

Ricketts agreed, adding that the U.K. shouldn’t want to “cut ourselves off from normal commercial relations” with China.

“I think in many ways, the U.S. policy on China, to the extent you can deduce it, is to have an across the board confrontation, but then make some exceptions where it's in the U.S. interest,” he said. “I don't think that's the British interest, actually. I think British interests are more closely aligned, probably with other European countries.”

But he added: “There will be areas of national security priority where I'm sure the British and American communities do have very similar interests, and no doubt close cooperation.”

Industry officials have said the recently announced trade framework between the U.K. and U.S. includes language that the Trump administration could use to pressure the U.K. in its trading relationship with China (see 2505090006).

Asked by one Parliament member whether it’s possible for the U.K. to navigate a middle ground toward China as opposed to following the “American way,” Ellehuus said she believes the U.K. and its allies can work, for example, on setting rules around the “Chinese content you can have in systems” while also making “room for partnership” with China in other areas.

“Maybe I'm being overly optimistic,” she said, “but I do think that you can try to move both continental Europe and the United States in a direction that's more middle ground and pragmatic.”

The U.K.’s new national security strategy warns that the U.K. will likely continue to be “profoundly affected by tensions between the major powers and regulatory blocs on trade,” pointing to a rise in protectionism. “Economic coercion will become more common as other states weaponise trade or use export controls and supply chain dependencies to gain advantage,” it said.

But the U.K. also said one of the “vital lessons” it has learned from the Russia-Ukraine war is the “importance of measures like sanctions and export controls.” To deter other countries from similar acts of aggression, the U.K. will need to move toward “more incorporation of economic measures into our defence and security toolkit.”

It also said sanctions and export controls are most effective when coordinated with allies, particularly with the Group of 7 nations and the Five Eyes members. “As part of our Economic Deterrence Initiative, we are working to strengthen our sanctions implementation and enforcement,” including through the U.K.'s recently launched Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (see 2505210062 and 2502140007).