US Needs More Tech Research Restrictions to Counter China, Lawmakers Hear

Jeffrey Stoff, president of the nonprofit Center for Research Security & Integrity, said the U.S. and American academia need to have “candid and perhaps uncomfortable conversations” about cutting off certain collaborations with entities tied to the Chinese government. Stoff, who previously worked as a China analyst for the U.S. government, said he found more than 27,000 articles published within the past five years involving collaborations between U.S. institutions and Chinese state-owned enterprises. He said American universities “continue to demonstrate a systemic disregard for national security considerations” related to China.

Part of the problem stems from the “lack of regulatory oversight” over fundamental research, said Stoff, speaking last week during a House Committee on Science, Space and Technology subcommittee hearing. Fundamental research, which is research that’s intended to be widely published and shared within the scientific community, is generally not subject to Bureau of Industry and Security export controls, but Stoff suggested it may need to be.

Not controlling fundamental research “worked fine through the Cold War,” he said, “but now fails to address geostrategic realities.”

The Commerce Department chapter in Project 2025, the conservative blueprint for how the Trump administration should overhaul the federal government, calls on BIS to tighten its definition of “fundamental research” to "address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment." BIS is currently led by two Trump-appointed officials who were recognized as contributors to the Commerce chapter in Project 2025 (see 2502280006).

Universities and industry groups have previously asked the government to clarify guidance about the type of research activities that are and aren't subject to export controls (see 2205030045, 2302020034 and 2409230001).

Subcommittee Chair Rep. Rich McCormick, R-Ga., also said he thinks the U.S. needs to better restrict Chinese access to sensitive research. While some collaboration is a “good thing,” the U.S. should be tightening “guardrails” around any research involving artificial intelligence and quantum computing “to make sure that we stay in the leading edge of technologies, and that we continue to be competitive.”

“Our nation's premier research institutions have been an all you can eat buffet for other countries right now, especially our adversaries,” McCormick said. The U.S. may need to “review federal regulations that are seen both as too burdensome and also those that are too lenient.”

The chair of the House committee, Rep. Brian Babin, R-Texas, said he’s specifically concerned Chinese entities are finding loopholes in existing U.S. technology restrictions, including by making early investments in U.S. startups that work closely with university researchers that own sensitive intellectual property. Babin noted that some American universities partner with startups but sometimes “lack transparency about the startups’ investors,” who could be connected to the Chinese government.

If a Chinese company invests early enough in a startup, they could be “avoiding a review” by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., Babin said. “Clearly, this is a complex task that requires thoughtful consideration.”

Maria Zuber, the presidential adviser for science and technology policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, made similar points, saying in written testimony that universities often have “no way of knowing whether, say, a Chinese entity is an investor at the time of the start-up’s creation, or at some later point.” She said that the startup “would not be subject to review” by CFIUS because the “IP would not be foreign owned.”

“There is an area where additional information and restrictions may be needed,” Zuber said.

But Zuber also warned lawmakers against pursuing too many restrictions. She acknowledged that some universities have been “slow to appreciate the threat posed by China,” but that has changed in recent years. MIT, she said, cut ties with Huawei more than six years ago, and the school created a special review process for research collaborations with China in 2019. “At MIT, any proposed collaboration with China is reviewed for its potential impact on national security, economic security, and human rights,” she said.

But cutting all ties with China “would likely hobble the U.S. competitiveness as much as it would harm China.” She said universities should instead work closer with the government -- specifically mentioning the BIS Office of Export Enforcement -- to better understand what can’t be shared with certain foreign researchers.

BIS under the Biden administration launched a university outreach program aimed at improving compliance at schools that face a higher risk for illegal tech transfers (see 2303100021).

“Protective policies are needed, but they're not enough. We have to strengthen our own research enterprise,” Zuber said.

She pointed to the advanced AI model recently developed by DeepSeek, a Chinese startup, which sparked questions about the effectiveness of U.S. export controls (see 2502120003, 2502030031 and 2501300067).

“One need look no farther than the recent announcement by the Chinese AI firm DeepSeek to know that restrictions may buy us some time, but they will not prevent Chinese technological advancement,” she said during the hearing. “We must win this race by running faster, not just by trying to trip up the competition.”

John Sargent, a former science and technology policy specialist with the Congressional Research Service, took a more critical stance against American universities, saying they’re not doing enough to stop China from being involved in advanced technology research, especially for research funded by the U.S. government. He said the U.S. should “start with the rebuttable presumption” that any federally funded science and technology cooperation with China is “not in the national interest of the United States.”

The U.S. government too often meets “resistance from the academic community, which in large measure would prefer to go about its business with no restrictions,” Sargent said. “We need a sea change in the way researchers understand their obligations to the country. They need to bring an attitude toward making this work for America,” and treat it not just as an “exercise to be met with minimal compliance.”