Evolving Space Industry Causing Missile-Related Export Control Challenges, Researchers Say
Members of the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime need to do more to account for rising innovation and commercialization in the global space technology industry, which may be making export control enforcement more challenging and increasing the risk of missile proliferation, researchers said in a recent report.
The report, released in October by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said the emergence of a so-called NewSpace industry is giving more companies, research institutes and universities access to dual-use technology and “know-how” needed to make rockets, space launch vehicles and other MTCR-controlled items, but many of these entities aren’t adhering to the MTCR export control list. That means more companies and researchers may be susceptible to “illicit procurement efforts,” the report argued, including by countries looking to evade missile-related export controls to make chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
The SIPRI researchers define the NewSpace industry as the group of emerging, private space-related startups and research entities that rely on venture capital and other private funding sources. This industry, which includes companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin, is viewed as different from the traditional space technology sector because they aren’t heavily relying on government-funded space efforts.
Although several segments of the NewSpace industry develop or use missile technology, their knowledge about proliferation risks or their use of export compliance programs varies significantly among NewSpace stakeholders, the researchers said.
SIPRI said it studied the missile-related NewSpace industry of 84 countries, including the 35 MTCR members, four states that have submitted a political declaration to adhere to the MTCR guidelines, and 45 states not participating in the MTCR, and it found that more than half of the 49 MTCR adherents and other “non-partners” have NewSpace companies working on missile technology. But it said just over one-third of those states have adopted the current or previous version of the MTCR control list into their national export control system.
To address risks posed by the new companies in this space, the researchers called for MTCR states to agree to, and promote, “common approaches to reducing missile proliferation risks created by developments of the NewSpace industry.” This may include adding more countries with NewSpace industries to the MTCR or increasing “targeted outreach missions” with those countries to speak about export controls, invite them to “technical” meetings and “encourage them to unilaterally adhere to the MTCR guidelines and adopt the annex.”
The researchers acknowledged that the “prospects” of adding some countries to the MTCR, especially China, are “slim,” but it’s still “important to continue official outreach and dialogue efforts and build on recent engagement.”
MTCR members can also issue guidance on proliferation risks faced by the NewSpace industry, stress the importance of controls on intangible transfers of technology and software, and “increase the vigilance they exercise in enforcement of export controls in relation to NewSpace stakeholders,” the researchers said.
They also said MTCR members can use the regime as a “forum for enforcement officers to share good practices,” and they should educate non-members about “key export control violation risks related to NewSpace and share lessons learned.”